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CALIFORNIA'S TIDELANDS TRUST FOR
MODIFIABLE PUBLIC PURPOSES
California's coastline is a unique natural resource. Competition for
its use, already intense, grows constantly greater.1 Although over 90%
of the state's population live within the 8% of the area nearest the
seashore,2 barely one-quarter of the coastline is open to direct public
access.3 Moreover, there is an increased public awareness of this re-
source's irreplaceability and a growing recognition of the need to con-
sider environmental and ecological factors in determining what uses
shall be permitted to compete in various segments of the shoreline.4 A
comprehensive coastal zone management plan is required, 5 but such
plans are regularly frustrated by a lack of adequate funding.6
The tidelands 7 that portion of the shore covered and uncovered by
the daily ebb and flow of the tides, are an important, if not the key,
area in the management of land use in the entire coastal zone. Ef-
fective control over the use made of the tidelands not only determines
the method of their utilization and, to a large degree, that of the im-
mediate littorals area, but may indirectly influence the use of inland
1. See COMMITTEE ON OCEAN RESOURCES, REsouRcEs AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA, CAL-
IFORNIA AN) THE OCEAN 81 (1966).
2. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALm', ENVIRON-
MENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF
RIGHTS].
3. Only about 275 miles of the entire 1,087-mile California coast are available di-
rectly to the public. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3, 1973, § I, at 1, col. 8, at 23, cols.
3-4.
4. These irreplaceable environmental values are threatened only briefly, for once
the planned developments materialize the threat is over. In its stead are irreversible
changes. Immediate action must be taken to prevent the destruction of these
environmental values. ENVIRONMENTAL BLL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 36.
5. The need has been recognized and declared by the California legislature itself.
See notes 218-29 infra and accompanying text.
6. 3 UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SCHOOL OF LAW, MAINE LAW AFFECTING MARINE RE-
SOURCES, REGULATION OF THE COAST: LAND AND WATER USES 531 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as UNIVERSITY OF MAINE].
7. "Tideland" is land which is "covered and uncovered by the daily flux and reflux
of the tides." City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 182,
50 P. 277, 285 (1897). The line of high water is that set by the mean neap, or ordi-
nary, tides. See People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 159-61,
51 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218 (1966). "Tidelands," when used in reference to the "tidelands
trust," also includes submerged lands as well as those described above. San Pedro,
L.A. & S.L.R.R. v. Hamilton, 161 Cal. 610, 614, 119 P. 1073, 1074 (1911).
8. "Bordering on the shore; pertaining to the shore of the sea." BALLENTnE'S
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areas to a significant extentY
California's tidelands are encompassed by the "tidelands trust," a
doctrine which originated in Elizabethan England and under which
the state, as trustee of a "public trust,"'1 protects public uses" in the
foreshore12 which are traditionally defined in terms of navigation,
commerce, and fishery. The concept in its traditional molding has
proven inadequate to protect the public interest;13 however, in De-
cember, 1971, the California Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney
1 4
unanimously recognized an additional public use within the trust based
solely on environmental, scenic, climactic, and spatial considerations:
the preservation of the tidelands in their natural state.' Even more
important for the public interest was the fact that the court made it
clear that there are still other public uses within the trust terms, likewise
based on environmental and ecological considerations, which have not,
as yet, been definitively stated.' Further, such heretofore unrecognized
public uses of the foreshore could be implemented as part of a com-
prehensive coastal zone management plan with little or no need for
the "taking" of private property, the "just compensation" for which has
been the consistent bane of such plans in the past.Y1
Admittedly this recognition of environmentally-based public uses in
the tidelands was made in an obiter dictum having little or nothing to
do with the actual controversy between the parties.' 8  But such "state-
LAw DICTIONARY 746 (3d ed. 1969), i.e., the property which extends down to the
line of mean high tide, at which point the tidelands begin. See note 7 supra.
9. This indeterminate effect is discussed in notes 268-75 infra and accompanying text.
10. "A charitable trust." BALLENTInE'S LAw DICIONARY 1025 (3d ed. 1969).
See note 44 infra.
11. "The use of premises by the public at large, that is, the general, unorganized
public, rather than by one person, a limited number of persons, or a restricted group."
BATLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 1025 (3d ed. 1969).
12. "The territory lying between the lines of high water and low water, over which the
tide ebbs and flows." BALLENT1N'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (3d ed. 1969). Within this
Comment, the term "foreshore" will be used synonymously with "tideland." See
note 7 supra.
13. "[E]xisting legislation is not adequate to protect the public interest." CAL-
IFoRNrA AUvisoRY COMM'N ON MARINE & COASTAL REsouRcEs, DEFINING THE CAL,
iFORNIA PUBLIC INTEREST IN COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 7 (1970).
14. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374,98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
15. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
16. Id. at 260, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
17. See notes 258-67 infra and accompanying text,
18. The case arose when Marks sued to quiet title to certain tidelands owned by
him and to enjoin the neighboring landowner, Whitney, and others from asserting any
claim or right in his property. 6 Cal. 3d at 256, 491 P.2d at 377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at
793. Whitney opposed on the grounds that his rights, both as the littoral owner and
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ments in passing," although not legally binding, are oftentimes used
by courts to express their opinions on questions and issues related to,
although not present in, the controversy before them. 9 As will be
shown to have been the case in Marks, they can also constitute threats
to take action unless legislative changes are made.2"
After noting that Marks' tidelands were subject to a public trust ease-
ment "traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fish-
eries,' the court recognized that:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state
is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of
utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that
one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encom-
passed within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in
their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scien-
tific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and
habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely
all the public uses which encumber tidelands. 22
as a member of the general public, would be thereby terminated and requested, by way
of cross-complaint, a declaration that Marks' title to the tidelands was burdened with a
perpetual public trust easement for fisheries, commerce, and navigation owned by
him and the other members of the general public, as well as with certain prescriptive
rights claimed personally by Whitney as the littoral owner. The Superior Court of
Main County did find a prescriptive easement in Whitney's favor across Marks' tide-
lands, 6 Cal. 3d at 256, 491 P.2d at 377-78, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94, but held that
Whitney had no standing to raise the public trust issue and refused to make a finding
as to whether or not the tidelands were so burdened. Id. at 256, 491 P.2d at 377,
98 Cal. Rptr. at 793. The court of appeal affirmed. 90 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23
(1970), vacated, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). Whit-
ney appealed the same "traditional" trust for "fisheries, commerce, and navigation," to
the California Supreme Court, apparently because the lower courts had restricted his
personal prescriptive rights of navigational ingress and egress over Marks' tidelands to
an existing wharf and "seven-foot wide easement area." 6 Cal. 3d at 256, 491 P.2d
at 378, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 794. The trust, as he asserted it, would have permitted
Whitney access over the almost 350 feet of Marks' tidelands which abutted his littoral
property. Id. at 257, 491 P.2d at 378, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 794. There was apparently
no environmental concern in the motivation of either party. See Taylor, Patented
Tidelands: A Naked Fee?, 47 CALn. ST. B.J. 420, 423 (1972).
19. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 543 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SAx].
20. See notes 247-48 infra and accompanying text.
21. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
22. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (citation omitted). The
case cited in the quotation, Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal.
2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), recognized that the use to which tide-
1973] 487
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But the court then proceeded to point out that Marks' title was bur-
dened solely with the traditional public rights of navigation, commerce,
and fishery." Its failure to recognize a present right in the general
public to the use of preservation, or to recognize any public use other
than navigation, commerce, and fishery, was clearly significant. Imme-
diately prior to its recognition of the use of preservation, the court
listed various recreational uses of the tidelands by the general public
which have been held to be rights encompassed within traditional trust
purposes.14 However, it did not similarly link preservation to the tra-
ditional trust uses in the sense that preservation is merely to be deemed
an acceptable mode of exercising those uses. If it had meant to do so,
it would have held that there was a present right in the public to the
"use" of preservation. It mentioned no such right.25
lands are put must be that "by which the general welfare is best to be served." Id.
at 422, 432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
23. A proper judgment for a patentee of tidelands was determined by this court
..to be that he owns "the soil, subject to the easement of the public for the
public uses of navigation and commerce, and to the right of the state, as ad-
ministrator and controller of these public uses and the public trust thereof, to
enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement of the
public uses and to make such changes and improvements as may be deemed ad-
visable for these purposes." Id. at 261, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 797,
quoting People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 598-99, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
24. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. "[Public trust ease-
ments] have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating and general recreational purposes... ." Id. This, however, refers to public
trust easements in other states as well as in California. The only two California
cases cited by the court to support the above contention, Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.
App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951), and Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156
(1912), held only that various forms of recreational boating were permissibly naviga-
tion.
25. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. Nor did the court say
that the public trust easement in California tidelands has been held to include all the
public rights listed in its compilation quoted in note 24 supra.
Other states have attempted to link preservation of the tidelands to the traditional
servitudes, and have done so explicitly. Massachusetts, for example, in Commissioner
of Nat. Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1965), built upon the
traditional trust purpose of fishery to hold that adequate conservation was required to
protect and extend the viability of the servitude. Specifically, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court held that the ecological balance of certain marshlands proposed to be
filled would have to be preserved in order to protect the public right of fishery. Id.
at 669-71. However, Volpe fails to give environmental considerations an independent
priority in any way comparable to that of the traditional servitudes (id. at 671), and
it must be noted that the creation of such legal fictions extending the traditional servi-
tudes have acted against, rather than for, environmental and conservational purposes
in California, e.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928), cert. dented,
280 U.S. 517 (1929). The California Surveyor-General had refused to issue a permit
for oil prospecting in tidelands on the ground that, inter alia, subsequent drilling
operations would pollute the surrounding ocean "to such an extent as to render the
[Vol. 6
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What the dictum did say was that preservation is "encompassed
within the tidelands trust. '2 6  The court cited no authority for this
proposition; however, although the public has no present right to the
use of preservation, it is clear that such use would be permissible under
the state's administration of public uses. The implication is that the
public can be given the right to preservation of the foreshore.
This concept of public rights to modifiable uses of the foreshore does
not square well with the history of the doctrine in California or else-
where. In California, for example, the uses of the tidelands to which
the general public have rights have not varied from navigation, com-
merce, and fishery in over 120 years and were generally regarded as
immutably fixed to those three uses.27  HOw, then, can they be modi-
fiable?
The answer to that question lies in the very nature of the public
trust doctrine. Its history might lead one to conclude that the doctrine
is inadequate to meet the current requirements of the public interest
in tidelands,28 but one must closely examine that history in order to
discover the true nature of the doctrine and to avoid a continuation of
its apparent inadequacy.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC
RIGHTS IN THE FORESHORE
The concept of public rights in the foreshore dates from Roman
times, if not earlier.29  The common right of the Roman citizenry in
the seashore was often expressed in absolute terms. As described by
the Institutes of Justinian:
The public use of the sea-shore, too, is part of the law of nations, as is
that of the sea itself; and therefore any person is at liberty to place
on it a cottage, to which he may retreat, or to dry his nets there,
and haul them from the sea; for the shores may be said to be the
property of no man .... 30
Some legal commentary has seen this expansive Roman concept as
fish therein unfit for human consumption." Id. at 168, 273 P. at 806. The court or-
dered issuance of the permit, stating "the use of gasoline and oil to be practically
indispensable to the needs of rapid, expanding, industry and commerce." Id. at 182,
273 P. at 812 (emphasis added).
26. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
27. See notes 209-15 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
29. See W. HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 309-11 (4th ed. 1903) [hereinafter cited as
HUNTER].
30. INsnTuTs 2.1.5.
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being more or less integrally incorporated into Anglo-Saxon common
law at its inception and maintained until the present day.81 Whether
or not the concept was really quite so expansive or was, in fact, in-
corporated into Anglo-American jurisprudence, however, does not bear
on the legal, as opposed to the spiritual, ancestry of any presently
existing public rights in the foreshore.
It is settled that the absolute ownership of all lands in the English
realm was vested in the crown by the time of the Norman Con-
quest of 1066, if not earlier.8 2  All early English private titles de-
rived originally from crown grants, which often lacked precision, par-
ticularly in the case of coastal grants which regularly omitted a de-
scription of the seaward boundary.38 Such coastal grantees came to
consider their property as extending down into the sea, and originally
were not opposed in that belief by the crown. 4
The idea that the foreshore had been omitted from the scope of royal
coastal grants was first advanced in the 1560's,-5 although it was not
judicially accepted until 1632 during the reign of Charles 1.86 The con-
cept of such retained royal title to the foreshore was later adopted by
Sir Matthew Hale in his treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum
Ejusdem,37 which first appeared in 1670,38 further strengthening the
31. See, e.g., Note, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HAST. L.J. 759
(1971); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970). Evidence is lacking that such "public rights"
could be asserted successfully against a recalcitrant government. See HUNTER, supra
note 29, at 311; 79 YALE L.J. at 764-65.
32. 3 ANMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.1 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); S. MOORE, A
-hsToRY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAw RELATING THERETO 24, 27 (3d ed. 1888)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
33. MOORE, supra note 32, at 1, 2.
34. Id. at XXX, 51. It is not certain whether the lack of royal opposition was due
to acquiescence, oversight, or the press of more urgent matters. 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 36.3 (A) (R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as WATERS].
35. WATERS, supra note 34, at § 36.3(A); MOORE, supra note 32, at 185-211 wherein
the original treatise of Thomas Digges is reprinted. Descriptions of Digges range from
"mathematician, engineer, astronomer, and lawyer," WATERS § 36.3(A), to "an im-
pecunious courtier [bent on procuring the royal favor]," Comment, Waters and Water-
courses-Right of Public Passage Along Great Lakes Beaches, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1134,
1136 n.4 (1933). It would be ironic if public rights in the foreshore stem from an
individual's attempt to achieve personal gain some four centuries ago.
36. Attorney General v. Philpott, 8 Chan. 1 (1632), reprinted in MOORE, supra note
32, app. I at 895. This doctrine was obviously regarded in certain interested circles as
both relatively successful and extremely novel. One of the specifications later levelled
at Charles I in depriving him of his crown was "the taking away of men's rights under
colour of the King's title to land between high and low water mark." MooRE, at 310;
WATERS, supra note 34, at § 36.3(A).
37. Reprinted in MOORE, supra note 32, at 370-413 and in R. HALL, ESSAY ON Tm
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legal status of the doctrine. 9 This retained royal title was the jus
privatum,40 or personal right, of the king and originally encompassed
the complete legal and equitable ownership of the foreshore.41
But subsequent to and because of the early judicial acceptance of
its prima facie title to the foreshore, political pressure had forced the
crown to stipulate that its title was held for the public purposes of
navigation and fishery,42 thereby transforming that portion of the royal
personal title into the jus publicum,43 or public right. The jus publicwn
continued to be held by the sovereign personally, although in a repre-
sentative capacity. The property interest represented by the jus
publicum was, in effect, the trust res of a declared charitable trust.4"
Through Parliamentary limitation, subsequent crown grants of the fore-
shore to individuals conveyed only the royal personal title (]us privatum),
and it thus became established that such crown grantees took subject to
the public rights of navigation and fishery, as represented by the ]us
publicum which had remained behind in the crown;45 however, the
RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES oF THE SuBJEcr iN THE SEA SHOREs OF
THE REALM, app. (2d ed. 1875) [hereinafter cited as R. HALL].
38. WATERS, supra note 34, at § 36.3(A) n.54. The treatise was not first published,
however, until 1787. Id.
39. "The impact of this treatise was such that the burden of proof was placed upon
the subject to show that his land extended to the low-water mark. In the absence
of proof of a specific grant of the tidelands, placement of the burden of proof could be
decisive." WATERs, supra note 34, § 36.3(A), quoting Attorney General v. Burridge,
147 Eng. Rep. 335, 342 (Ex., 1822) ("'It is a doctrine of ancient establishment, that
the shore between the high- and low-water marks belongs prima facie to the King."');
Attorney General v. Parmeter, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex., 1811), aff'd. sub nom.
Parmeter v. Gibbs, 147 Eng. Rep. 356 (Ex., 1813); Attorney General v. Richards,
145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex., 1795).
40. "A private right. Any right held by the king of England in his individual
capacity was known as jus privatum. Any light which he held in a representative
capacity was known as jus publicum, a public right." BALLENTiN'S L-Aw DiCTiONARY
695 (3d ed. 1969). See note 43 infra.
41. See text accompanying note 32, supra.
42. Comment, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 706-
08 (1922); cf. 36 HAnv. L. REv. 763 (1923); 33 HAv. L. REv. 458 (1920).
43. "A public right; a right held by the king in a representative capacity." BALLEN-
Tn'E's LAW DicnoN~AY 695 (3d ed. 1969). See note 40 supra. "[Tlhe property,
indeed .... is vested in the sovereign but ... not for his own use. . . ." Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 77 (1821).
44. "A trust for the benefit of an indefinite class of persons constituting some por-
tion or class of the public or, more broadly defined, a trust limiting property to some
public use . . . ." BALLENinE'S LAw DICTIONARY 194 (3d ed. 1969). The trust,
however, is discretionary in that any public rights granted thereunder are taken subject
to defeasance by further parliamentary limitation to which the royal assent is given,
which assent acts as a declaration of trust. See note 47 infra.
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remainder of the equitable interest, the right to all other possible uses
of the foreshore, passed to the grantee along with the legal title.40
In cases where the royal jus privatum had not been granted to pri-
vate parties, it was and still is possible that additional uses included
within that private right might be declared jus publicum and thereby
be transferred into the public right. As yet, however, there has
been no such enlargement of the scope of public rights under the Eng-
lish trust.48 Consequently, the rights of the British public have been
strictly limited to navigation and fishery, as well as those other rights
incidental to and strictly necessary for the exercise of the two primary
rights.49 The independent existence of public bathing and other recre-
ational rights has been specifically rejected, and those attempting to as-
sert such rights have been treated as trespassers, whether the tidelands
in question were still crown property or had passed to private grant-
ees. 50 Although criticized by English legal commentators virtually since
its inception, this restriction of public rights to navigation and fishery
endures."'
45. M. HALE, DE JuRE MARis ET B.ACHIoRuM EJUSDEM, reprinted in MooRE, supra
note 32, at 404-05; Comment, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, supra note
42, at 708. See also Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B., 1821), which
contained the first definitive statement on the alleged existence of public rights to
use the foreshore for purposes other than navigation and fishery. It was held that a
private owner did not hold subject to any public right of bathing. id. at 1190.
See also Llandudno Urban Dist. Council v. Woods, [1899] 2 Ch. 705, 708-09 (public
on privately-owned tidelands but not engaged in navigation or fishery deemed tres-
passers). But see dissent of Best, J., in Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1193-97,
summarized in WATERS, supra note 34, at § 36.3(A) n.56.
46. See note 45 supra. Apparently, the crown can no longer alienate even its jus
privatum without specific Parliamentary authorization. R. HALL, supra note 37, at
106 n.10.
47. 'qhese [public] rights are variously modified, promoted, or restrained by the
common law, and by numerous acts of parliament. .. .." R. HALL, supra note 37,
at 108.
48. WATERS, supra note 34, at § 36.4(B); Comment, Waters and Watercourses-
Right of Public Passage Along Great Lake Beaches, supra note 35, at 1137. See also
39 HAsrturty, Tim LAws oF ENGLAND 562-72 (3d ed. 1962).
49. Brinckman v. Matley, [1904] 2 Ch. 313, 317 (public right recognized to pass
over tidelands to exercise established public rights of navigation and fishery); WATERS,
supra note 34, at § 36.4(B).
50. "The public have no common right to use the foreshore to pass or repass
thereon for the purpose of bathing in the sea, whether the foreshore is the property of
the Crown or of a private owner." Brinckman v. Matley, [1904] 2 Ch. at 313 (syl-
labus).
51. WATRS, supra note 34, § 36.4(B). See Comment, Waters and Watercourses-
Right of Public Passage Along Great Lake Beaches, supra note 35, at 1137.
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II. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF PUBLIC RIGHTS IN AMERICA
Upon the success of the American Revolution, the people of each
state became in themselves sovereign and succeeded to the ownership
not only of the king's jus publicum (under which, as British subjects,
they had possessed the rights of navigation and fishery), but also of
the royal jus privatum,52 which gave them the "absolute right. . . for
their own common use."'53 However, this succession of "the people" to
the ownership of those two royal rights was metaphorical and has been
the source of much confusion concerning public rights in the fore-
shore. Strictly speaking, it was the organism of the state as sovereign
which succeeded to the ownership of both royal rights.54 "[Tlhe State
represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their
united sovereignty."5 5  The original states, therefore, in cases where
there had been no prior alienation of the jus privatum,5 6 succeeded
to the complete legal and equitable ownership of their tidelands.57
In the subsequent formation of the federal government, these states
52. "[Ulpon the Revolution, all these royal rights became vested in the people of
New Jersey, as the sovereign of the country . . . ." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,
78 (1821); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 15 (1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). In Martin, the Court described the holding in Arnold as
being "entitled to great weight" and virtually incorporated that opinion as its own. Id.
at 418.
53. Id. at 410.
54. "Mhe several states hold and own the lands covered by navigable waters
within their respective boundaries in their sovereign capacity . .. . They have in
them a double right, a jus publicum and a jus privatum." City of Oakland v. Oakland
Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897). "And upon the American
Revolution, all the rights of the Crown and of Parliament vested in the several states
." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894) (emphasis added). See Barney
v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Koyer v. Miner, 172 Cal. 448, 453,
156 P. 1023, 1025 (1916); Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 261, 90 P. 532,
535 (1907).
55. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 24 (1894) (emphasis added); accord, McCready
v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876); see Pollards Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 229 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
56. The king had possessed the same dual title in English possessions in the Amer-
icas. "[When [the king] took possession of this country, by his right of discovery,
he took possession of it in his sovereign capacity; . . . he had the same right in it,
and the same power over it, as he had in and over his other dominions and no more
.... " Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 77. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 14 (1894).
57. "[Under] the British constitution all vacant lands are vested in the crown as
representing the nation . . . ." Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410
(1842). Since the states succeeded to the king's ownership (supra note 54, which was
complete legal and equitable title absent an alienation of the ius privatun (supra
notes 32, 41, 43, 56)), they took the same complete legal and equitable ownership.
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conveyed to it the power to control all navigable waters for the pur-
pose of regulating and improving navigation through the federal com-
merce power.58 Not having passed their ownership of the foreshore,
however, they retained it in themselves, subject only to the paramount
servitude over navigation which they had created in the general gov-
ernment. 59  Consequently, although the congressional commerce
power "comprehends navigation within the limits of every State in the
Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected
with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states
. . ","6 rights in tidelands and in lands under navigable waters
within state boundaries are governed and controlled by state rather
than federal law.61
As territorial possessions were acquired by the United States, the
tidelands and navigable waters therein were held by the federal govern-
ment and conveyed to the states upon their admission into the Union.62
Since new states enter the Union on an equal footing with the original
thirteen members,65 they also took complete legal and equitable own-
ership of their tidelands as an attribute of their sovereignty upon their
respective admissions, except, of course, for the retained federal navi-
gational servitude.64
58. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897); Eldridge v. Trezevant,
160 U.S. 452, 466-68 (1896); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 12 (1876).
59. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-30 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
60. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
61. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
62. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56,
63 (1921); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 404 (1903); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161,
183 (1891); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
63. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845). See, e.g., 9
Stat. 452 where California is declared "admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States in all respects whatever." See generally Hanna, Equal Foot-
ing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. Rv. 519 (1951).
64. Although the federal servitude will not be dealt with in this paper, which will
deal solely with public rights under state law, its inherent power and potential scope
should not be discounted nor forgotten. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). In that case, the Corps of Engineers
District Engineer had refused to grant the permit requisite for dredging and filling of
navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 although there would, ad-
mittedly, have been no adverse effect on navigation, 430 F.2d at 202, 207. The re-
fusal was based solely on ecological considerations. Id. at 202. The Court of Ap-
peals upheld the denial (id. at 214), since the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
required consideration of conservation of wildlife resources prior to issuance of a per-
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In past commentary on the tidelands, the concept of enforceable
rights in the general public is usually supported by an assertion of the
equitable ownership of the tidelands by the public's individual mem-
bers,"6 but the public had no such ownership rights under the prior
English trust 6 and, upon independence, the complete legal and equi-
table ownership, previously held by the king, became the property of
the state as an independent entity.6 7  State grants of part or all of its
ownership are most conspicuous by their absence. 68 Without such a
grant, individuals have no ownership rights in the foreshore. 69 Equi-
table ownership of the tidelands by the individual members of the
mit to dredge and fill (id. at 209), and a negative determination had been made. Id. at
202. But see Note, Coastal Zone Management-The Tidelands: Legislative Apathy vs.
Judicial Concern, 8 SAN DiNGo L. REV. 695, 728-32 (1971) as regards the doubtful wis-
dom in placing such authority in the Corps of Engineers and the possibility of federal
preemption in the area of coastal zone management.
65. E.g., Comment, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, supra note 42;
Comment, Waters and Watercourses-Right of Public Passage Along Great Lake
Beaches, supra note 35; Note, California's Tidelands Trust: Shoring It Up, supra note
31.
66. See notes 42 and 43 supra.
67. There are cases which have said exactly the opposite, although, apparently, not
in California. An example is City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927)
wherein the court said that "[t]he equitable title to these submerged lands vests in the
public at large, while the legal title vests in the state . . . ." Id. at 830. Such a
statement could hardly be any more explicit, but it at least admits that any rights of
property ownership held by the general public would not be continuations of identical
rights held under the previous English Trust. Were they, the title would be already
vested prior to the vesting of the state's interest. But if, then, the entire ownership is
derived from the king, it seems quite incomprehensible that part of it should vest in the
unitary organism of the state, while the remainder vests in the public at large, especially
in proportions so radically different frdm the prior apparent "apportionment" between
sovereign and subject.
In any event, dicta such as this have not appeared in recent cases, and that is just
as well. Although a romantic concept, public equitable ownership of trust lands would
effectively prohibit any reallocation of the resource after its initial allocation. See
notes 68-75 infra and accompanying text. Further, in the absence of some "mechanism"
or "system" to make the class of equitable owners subject to open to admit new
members, which cases such as this have never even considered, the equitable owner-
ship would be strictly limited to those individuals who were part of that "public at
large" when the state achieved its sovereignty, and their direct lineal descendants.
People moving to the jurisdiction after sovereignty, and their descendants, would have
no ownership rights in trust lands. Even the present-day descendants of the original
"equitable owners" would have unequal rights due to the variable number and extent of
division of his ancestor's title as determined by individual lineage. Although intended
to "democratize" the trust lands by making each citizen an equal owner thereof, the
concept of public equitable ownership of the foreshore fails when confronted by legal
practicalities.
68. See SAx, supra note 19, at 478 n.28.
69. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
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general public would effectively prohibit any modification of the origi-
nal use of such lands. This static situation would arise since such a
reallocation of the resource would constitute a taking of private prop-
erty for public use within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tions.7 ° It has been maintained that:
It is difficult to understand why the government should be prevented
from taking property which is owned by the public as a whole. Whether
or not the people and the government should theoretically be recog-
nized as distinct, it is clear that the concept underlying the constitu-
tional protection against taking [that the public should bear the cost for
property taken for public use] does not accommodate itself very easily
to situations in which the public as a whole claims to be a property
owner.
1
However, the theoretical distinction between people and government
is of critical importance. If the "public' owning the property is viewed
as a single entity, then it is the state, "the people in their united sov-
ereignty," which is owner, and the individual citizen has no property in-
terest which can be the subject of a taking. Conversely, if the "public"
equitably owning the property is viewed as the mass of individuals,
then each of them owns a private undivided interest in that equitable
ownership. Any diminution of the manner in which the individual
can permissibly exercise his interest consequently "takes" a portion of
his ownership right.72 Or, as the above-quoted opinion concludes:
To accept such claims of [individual] property rights would be to pro-
hibit the government from ever accommodating new public needs by
reallocating resources.7 3
In all likelihood, initial governmental allocations of natural resources
would be irreversible. Such a move could possibly be enjoined by
parties who preferred maintenance of their rights to the receipt of
compensation. 74  In any event, the burden of paying "just compensa-
tion" for the rights taken would be insurmountable as a practical mat-
ter.75
Nor can public rights to use the American foreshore be merely con-
tinuations of those non-ownership rights which the public had previ-
70. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
71. SAx, supra note 19, at 479-80.
72. This, perhaps, can best be shown by analogy. When the owner of an undivided
equitable ownership interest is subsequently prohibited from making a certain, previ-
ously permissible, use of the property, a portion of his interest has been taken.
73. SAX, supra note 19, at 482.
74. Id. at 482 n.35.
75. See note 70 supra. As to the additional strictness of the California provision,
see notes 260-67 infra and accompanying text.
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ously held as British subjects."' Previous restrictions on the royal own-
ership created those rights in the public but are unenforceable against
the independent American states. In the first place, such restrictions
had been placed solely on the king personally but not on the power
of the government generally.77 Secondly, even if the restrictions had
applied to the English government as a whole, their continued appli-
cability to a successor obtaining ownership by right of conquest 78 could
only be imposed either by the latter's acquiescence or by fundamental
functional limitations imposed upon that successor by its inherent char-
acter.79
The mass of individual citizens, therefore, do not own the equitable
title to the foreshore and there is no continuation of the rights which
they possessed under the English trust. Public rights under the Amer-
ican trust doctrine were shaped anew in the same way that they had been
under the English trust. The very existence, as well as the content
and scope, of any public rights to use the foreshore of American states
is dependent upon the manner in which the state deals with its prop-
erty and the restrictions placed upon its freedom of choice in so do-
ing.8 0 For example, if a state determines that public bathing is to be
permitted in certain of its tidelands, the public have a right to bathe.
If, however, the state later determines that boating is to henceforth
have a higher priority than bathing in the same tidelands, the latter
use, although still permissible, is severely constricted. Further, if the
particular tract is subsequently allocated to serve as a wildlife sanc-
tuary, with public bathing prohibited, the public right to bathe is de-
stroyed. No property interest 8' has been taken; no compensation is
required. A right has, of course, been either diminished or destroyed,
but such regulation occurs daily without any requirement of com-
76. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
77. See text accompanying notes 32-51 supra.
78. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367 (1842).
79. "That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political char-
acter, constitution or institutions of the substituted sovereign lose their force, is also
plain." Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357 (1911); accord, Alvarez y San-
chez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1910). See generally 16 C.J.S. Constitu-
tional Lmv § 15 (1956). As to the existence of such a functional limitation imposed
by the character of the independent American states, at least of a conditional nature,
see notes 85, 96-97, and 106-10 infra and accompanying text.
80. See generally SAx, supra note 19, at 482-83.
81. Although this may be characterized as a type of property interest (see notes
178-89 infra and accompanying text), it is not one within the meaning of the constitu-
tional protections against taking.
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pensatory relief.82
Ill. LIMITATIONS ON STATE FREEDOM OF
CHOICE IN TIDELAND ALLOCATION
If unrestricted the state could theoretically allot the foreshore to any
use. But what in fact are the limitations placed on a state's dealings
with its tidelands? Such limitations determine the state's freedom of
choice in allocating or reallocating tidelands to any one or more uses,
and it is these allocations which either create, modify, or destroy pub-
lic rights in the foreshore as well as determine the content, scope, and
potential viability of those rights. 83  For purposes of analysis, these
limitations on state freedom of action can be classified as either "ab-
solute" or "conditional." A limitation is "absolute" if it is one which
the state can neither modify nor abolish.84  "Conditional" limitations
are those which can be established, modified, or abrogated by the state
itself, but while in force they unconditionally restrict the scope of
permissible state action. 5
A. Absolute Limitations
The only absolute limitation on state control and use of its tidelands
is that "[t]he state exists . . . to promote the welfare of its citizens.
. .,,6 The very purpose for state governmental existence imposes on
82. Of course, due process, equal protection, and other constitutional limitations
must be complied with.
83. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
84. Of course, no limitation on government is theoretically absolute. However,
government as it is known in this country could not exist without the absolute limita-
tion described in notes 86-95 infra and accompanying text.
85. There are, of course, federal conditional limitations on state action in the fore-
shore. See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text. Whereas these are not "condi-
tional" in the sense that they can be modified or abrogated by the states, they are not
truly "absolute" since they can be modified or revoked by the national government.
Since this paper deals with public rights in tidelands under state law, these federal
limitations will not be dealt with herein. However, see note 64 supra.
86. Allbritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 803 (Miss. 1938), appeal dis-
missed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938). "[it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn
duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to
provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation . .. ." Mayor v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837). "TJhe welfare of the state, and the 'pro-
tection, security, and benefit of the people,' for which government is instituted, and
which has been by the people confided to it." In re Madera Irrigation Dist., 92
Cal. 296, 316, 28 P. 272, 276 (1891). CAL. CONST. art. I § 2 provides:
Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted
for the protection, security and benefit of the people, and they have the right to
alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it.
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all state action "the duty. . to protect its citizens and to provide for
the safety and good order of society.' ' 87 It is from this duty that the
state police power stems, which power exists "to promote the public
health, safety, morals, . . . or general welfare of the people .. . ,.,"
Securing the general welfare, therefore, is the real object of the police
power.
89
Although its purpose must be to promote the general welfare in its
dealings with all property, public or private, the tidelands were origi-
nally owned by the state. The basic concept of a "public trust 9
therefore arose from the common incidence of two factors: a state
ownership interest in the land and the all-inclusive requirement that
state action be designed to promote the general welfare. State owner-
ship increases the quantum of its police power ability to promote that
welfare to a level far above that it possesses over private property.91
The state, therefore, may be characterized as "trustee" of a charitable
trust of its land for the purpose of promoting the general welfare.92
It is not a true express trust93 since the state neither accepted its own-
ership on a special condition that it hold for the general welfare,94
nor did it declare that a previously unrestricted state ownership would
thereafter be so held. Although having the same basic effects as an
Although this duty to promote the general welfare is usually expressed in constitutional
provisions, which are conditional limitations, see note 101 supra, such expression of
them is merely a recognition of their existence. Whether so expressed or not, state
governments are so bound. See generally 81 CJ.S. States § 1 (1953).
87. Galyon v. Municipal Court, 229 Cal. App. 2d 667, 669, 40 Cal. Rptr. 446, 448
(1964),
88. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925)
(citations omitted).
89. East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945). See gener-
ally 16 CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 182 (1958).
90. See notes 11 and 44 supra and accompanying text.
91. Over private property, the police power is limited to reasonable regulation,
whereas, over state-owned property, the police power determines the use to which the
land is put. See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J 36 (1964).
92. It is rather like a private charitable trust where the trustee has discretion "to
apply the trust property to any charitable [i.e., public] purpose which he may se-
lect .... " RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS, § 396 (1959).
93. "A trust which arises out of a direct or positive declaration of trust. A trust
that comes into existence by the execution of an intention to create it by the person
having legal and equitable dominion over the property made subject to it." BR.LEN-
TiNE's IAw DicoNARY 442 (3d ed. 1969).
94. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 453, § 3: "[AIR the navigable waters within the
said State shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to inhabitants of said
State as to citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost or duty therefor."
California courts have never found the proviso to be a particular source of restraint on
state action in tidelands. See SAx, supra note 19, at 538-39.
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express charitable trust for the promotion of the general welfare, this
situation simply arose by operation of law upon the state's succes-
sion to the ownership of the property. The state's inherent char-
acter imposed on it the absolute limitation that, inter alia, it utilize its
property for the general welfare. All state land is held in the same
manner. State "proprietary"' 5 land is similarly restricted as to the gen-
eral purpose which the state may seek to serve in using it.
B. Conditional Limitations
Conditional limitations on state action in tidelands, those restrictions
which can be created, modified, or abrogated by the state itself,00 are
simply determinations by the state of what allocation of its land to a
particular use or set of uses best promotes the general welfare. These
determinations necessarily vary from state to state sincel each deals
with its tidelands "'according to its own views of justice and policy.' "07
They differ both in method of creation and in comparative dignity
and include: administrative determinations, 8  statutes, 9  initiative
measures, 00 and state constitutional provisions. 0 1 Conditional limi-
tations may be expansive, relating to all tidelands, or specific, apply-
ing to only a particular parcel; nevertheless, they create no policy de-
terminations which are truly irreversible. No allocation of tidelands
to a specific use is necessarily final. Although some conditional limi-
tations are more difficult to create, modify, or abrogate than others,
each can be eliminated by a subsequent and contrary pronouncement
95. "In the capacity of an owner. Being a proprietor." BALNTmNE'S IAW Dic-
TLONARY 1011 (3d ed. 1969). A state may hold property in two distinct capacities, the
one a proprietary capacity, as individuals generally hold property, and the other a gov-
ernmental, or sovereign capacity, i.e., for public use. 81 C.J.S. States § 104 (1958).
Whether or not land is held for public use is determined by conditional limitations.
See notes 96-102 infra and accompanying text.
96. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
97. Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, at 180, 273 P. 797, 811 (1928), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 517 (1929), quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1893).
98. The California legislature has delegated its powers of administration to the
State Lands Commission for the day-to-day management of the trust. CAL. Pun. Rus.
CODE ANN. § 6301 (West 1956).
99. Direct legislative determinations of the requirements of the general welfare.
The administration of the trust is vested in the legislature. City of Long Beach v.
Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 n.17, 476 P.2d 423, 437 n.17, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 n.17
(1970).
100. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (West Supp. 1972).
101. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (West Supp. 1972). "LT]he highest and most
solemn expression of the people of the state in behalf of the general welfare." Gin S.
Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 701, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
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of equal or superior dignity.10 2
IV. THE STATE OWNERSHIP INTEREST REQUIRED BY PUBLIC USES
Although the police power applies to both public and private prop-
erty with the same raison d'tre, it can only make land available pri-
marily for public uses when an ownership interest is retained by the
state. When private property is involved, the constitutional protection
against taking limits state police power to reasonable regulation. 103
Consequently, land which the state alienates into absolute private own-
ership can no longer be made available primarily for public uses by
state fiat. A return to state ownership through an exercise of emi-
nent domain would be required to guarantee that the primary use of
the land would be by the public at large. Activity on land absolutely
owned by private individuals will almost always be primarily private
in character.104 Obviously, then, if a state's conditional limitations or-
dain one or more uses of the tidelands by the public at large to be
most conducive to the general welfare, retained possession of an own-
ership interest by the state is required.
As noted previously, when the states succeeded to the ownership of
their tidelands, they were not constrained to hold their title on the same
conditions which had been personally applied to the king.'05 The
sole absolute limitation on their ownership was, and is, that they utilize
the tidelands to promote the general welfare as such might be deter-
mined by their local law.' 0 6 Since public use for purposes of naviga-
tion, commerce, 0 7 and fishery was held to be most conducive to the
102. The order in which the various principal types of conditional limitations are
listed in the text accompanying notes 115-18 supra is of ascending dignity. See also
SAx, supra note 19, at 482-83.
103. See note 91 supra.
104. Although the private owner may, of course, utilize his property for use by the
public at large by his own choice, state police power cannot guarantee that any such
use will continue absent a finding of implied dedication to such public use. See Gion
v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). See note
91 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 86, 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
107. Exactly when "commerce" entered the American definition of the trust pur-
poses is unclear, but this writer has found no use of it prior to the time of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which held that the federal commerce power
granted a paramount servitude over navigable waters to the national government. Id.
at 197; see notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text. "Commerce" may therefore
have entered the American definition of the trust terms by a reverse process. Since,
due to the inheritance of the English common law, the American states were held to
hold their tidelands for the same public uses for which the king had previously held,
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general welfare under the common law inherited by the states from Eng-
land,""8 these same public uses were immediately and de novo "con-
ditionally limited" into the American trust to the same extent they had
previously existed under the English.10 9 Thus, in America as well,
state ownership of the tidelands came to be characterized as a public
trust for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishery. Since
the general welfare required public uses of the foreshore, it also neces-
sitated state retention of an ownership interest.
A. The Basic Requisite State Ownership Interest
The scope of the state ownership interest necessary when the general
welfare is deemed to require public use of the foreshore was given its
first basic delineation in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.110 At issue
in that case was the validity of an 1873 repeal by the Illinois legisla-
ture of its prior 1869 grant to a railway company of an immense tract
of submerged land on the Chicago lake shore, amounting to "some-
thing more than a thousand acres.""' Since the repeal would have
been ineffective against a valid conveyance into absolute private own-
ership," it was necessary for the United States Supreme Court to de-
termine the extent to which such trust lands were alienable by the
states in conformance with the absolute limitation on their authority 1 8
The Court noted the "public character of the property,"'1 4 recog-
nizing that the land had previously been available to the public at
large for purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishery. 18 The gen-
eral welfare clearly required "preserving to the public the use of [the]
navigable waters [free] from private interruption and encroachment
"navigation, commerce, and fishery" was originally considered equivalent to the English
"navigation and fisheries," although, perhaps more amply stated A la Gibbons. But see
Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517
(1929).
108. See generally notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
109. The prior English conditional limitations determining such public uses to be
required by the general welfare (see notes 42-46, 108 supra and accompanying text),
were only binding on the independent American states due to their inheritance by
consent of the English common law (see, e.g., 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 3 (1967);
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5, 22.3 (West 1970)) and were modifiable at will by the states.
See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. See also CAL, CIV. CODE § 4 (West
1970).
110. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
111. Id. at 454.
112. Id. at 450-51.
113. Id. at 452. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
114. 146 U.S. at 456.
115. Id. at 452.
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... 116 Consequently, "any act of legislation concerning their use
affect[ed] the public welfare. '11 7  Although the Court stressed the
immensity of the parcel purportedly conveyed, the fact that it consti-
tuted virtually the entire harbor of a major city was clearly the deter-
minative factor.11s Within that harbor area, the state had the responsi-
bility to protect and promote its use by the public for purposes of nav-
igation, commerce, and fishery. Since state police power could only
guarantee that the land would be available for such public use when
an ownership interest was retained by the state, an absolute alienation
of the state's ownership of the entire harbor area would be contrary
to the general welfare;" 9 consequently, the original grant was held to
have created no property interest in the company.' 20
The Court did observe, however, that the state could completely alien-
ate its ownership interest as to "such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public [in the area as a whole]."'' Also, such state
control could be alienated as to lands which could "be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining."'2 2
Illinois Central, therefore, established the basic premise that the
state could not alienate its ownership of substantial portions of the
lands in which it was required to maintain and promote public uses. 2'
116. Id. at 436. In other words, they were "held by the people of the State in their
character as sovereign in trust for public uses for which they are adapted." Id. at
457-58.
117. Id. at 459.
118. Id. at 453-54.
119. Id. at 459.
120. Id. at 460. The grant was therefore held by the Court to have been a re-
vocable delegation of the state's police power, creating a license in the company,
which the 1873 repeal had been effective to terminate. Id. at 461. The Court ad-
mitted that it could cite no precedent for holding such a grant invalid (id. at 455),
but this case involved a purported absolute alienation of the state's interest in the en-
tire harbor area. Id. at 453. A license, of course, is the "privilege conferred by a
public body on a person for the doing of something which otherwise he would not
have the right to do." BALLENnmq's LAW DicrnoNARY 736 (3d ed. 1969). In this
case, the license was also a legal right since it was "founded on a statute which con-
fer[red] a privilege." Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38
(1939).
121. 146 U.S. at 453.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 454. This has continued down to the present day where the general
welfare requirement is defined in terms of the traditional public uses. See, e.g.,
County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1973), wherein
the court invalidated an attempted exchange of tidelands between the county and the
Irvine Company. Of the 644 acres in public control, 157 were to go to the company in
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Any diminution of its police power authority over such lands would be
repealable except as to those lands whose alienation would not impair
its ability to promote the public uses in the area as a whole and those
relatively small parcels of land which, although suitable for the re-
quired public uses, would better serve those uses if alienated.2
B. The Required State Ownership Interest in California
California had acquired ownership of her tide and submerged lands
by virtue of her sovereignty upon admission to the Union in 1850.121
The absolute limitation that state tidelands be utilized to promote the
general welfare as traditionally defined, as well as the consequential
requirement that state ownership of the lands be maintained, was recog-
nized in California long before its definitive exposition in Illinois Cen-
tral, 12  but the development of the state was seen as necessarily re-
quiring favorable treatment for special, private interests which were
deemed most capable of aiding the state's economic growth.' 27  Hence,
it is not suiprising that the state's de facto policy was that the favor-
itism of such special interests was promotive of the general welfare.128
In the area of the foreshore, literally thousands of acres of tidelands
were purportedly conveyed into absolute private ownership under vari-
ous patenting statutes129 within the first twenty years after California's
exchange for 147 acres in the bay in question and 120 additional acres further up the
bay area. However, since the exchange would have left only one-third of the immedi-
ate bay area in state control, the transaction was nullified under the same rationale as
in Illinois Central. Id. at 722-23, 728.
124. See notes 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text. However, by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, lands previously conveyed by the prior Spanish and Mexican
sovereignties did not pass to the United States in 1848. Treaty with the Republic of
Mexico, (Feb. 2, 1848), 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207. Therefore, any such previously
alienated tidelands were not conveyed to the state upon its admission to the Union in
1850. Act for the Admission of the State of California into the Union, ch. 50,
9 Stat. 452 (1850); Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867).
126. See, e.g., Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471 (1871); Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal.
365 (1867); Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854).
127. "Since man's main concern from the beginnings of California's development
has been the exploitation of resources to develop the economy, the bulk of the law
and the weight of judicial precedent has [sic] tended to favor special interests."
EIONMNTAL BILL OF R GHTS 18 (1970).
128. G. NASH, STATE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 124-36, 207-12,
339-58 (1964). See also Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. at 182, 273 P. at 812, wherein
it was stated that "the development of the mineral resources . . . is the settled policy
of state and nation, and the courts should not hamper this manifest policy except
upon the existence of most practical and substantial grounds."
129. Act of April 28, 1855, ch. 151, §§ 1-19, [1855] Cal. Stat. 189; Act of April 21,
1858, ch. 235, §§ 1-16, [1858] Cal. Stat. 198, as amended Act of April 18, 1859, ch. 314,
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admission to the Union.13°  Abuse of the public interest seems to have
been the rule with those early grants.' 31 Although the executive and
legislative departments of the state government assisted private interests
obtain state tide and other lands to virtually the full extent of which
they were capable, 132 the California judiciary was confronted by pre-
viously recognized public rights in the foreshore which "theoretically, at
least, [were inalienable].' 3   Consequently, grants of tidelands to private
parties under the patenting statutes were at first held by the California
courts to have conveyed either no title 34 or a voidable title.-35  Such
holdings were generally based upon some technical defect in the grant,'
36
but the virtual unanimity of the decisions clearly signaled some deeper,
more pervasive concern with the very legality of the attempted alienation
of the state's ownership interest under the patenting system.
137
The question of the validity of the patenting statutes and the titles
purportedly conveyed under them was resolved in the 1913 case of
People v. California Fish Co. 3 8 The case dealt with a conveyance
to a patentee and his payment to the state of the required purchase
price, both of which were effectuated after the ratification of the Cali-
fornia Constitution of 1879, but both the patenting statute under which
the grant had been made and the filing of the patentee's application
with the State Surveyor General were effectuated before ratification. 39
The court held that article XV, section 2 of the constitution, which
§§ 1-6, [1859] Cal. Stat. 340, as amended Act of May 14, 1861, ch. 356, §§ 1-2, [1861]
Cal. Stat. 363; Act of May 13, 1861, ch. 352, §§ 1-29, [1861] Cal. Stat. 355; Act of April
27, 1863, ch. 397, §§ 1-31, [1863] Cal. Stat. 591; Act of April 27, 1863, ch. 420,
§§ 1-13, [1863] Cal. Stat. 684; Act of March 28, 1868, ch. 415, §§ 1-72, [1867-68] Cal.
Stat. 507; Act of March 27, 1872, ch. 425, §§ 1-4, [1871-72] Cal. Stat. 622.
130. M. ScoTr, THE FuTuRE OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY 3 (1963).
131. Id. at 9. At the California state constitutional convention of 1878, delegate
N.G. Wyatt declared that:
If there is any one abuse greater than another that I think the people of the
State of California have suffered at the hands of their lawmaking power, it is the
abuse that they have received in the granting out and disposition of the lands
belonging to the State. ... 2 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1038
(1882).
132. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
133. Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867). See also note 126 supra and
accompanying text.
134. E.g., Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 103 (1873); People ex rel. Pierce v.
Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 (1864).
135. E.g., Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471 (1871).
136. See cases noted in notes 134-35 supra.
137. SAx, supra note 19, at 524-28.
138. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
139. Id. at 588, 138 P. at 84.
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guarantees public access to and free navigability of all navigable waters
within the state, 140 had been incorporated into the terms of the sale,
and that the mere filing of the application had not operated to create
any vested property right in the applicant. 14  Thus, access to the tide-
lands in question, and any others patented after 1879, was guaranteed
"for any public purpose.'
42
Alternatively, and of extreme importance in the case of tidelands
patented prior to the 1879 constitutional limitation, the court reached
the "same conclusion" solely on the basis of an examination of the
statutes under which the conveyances of tidelands had been author-
ized.' 4 3  The court reiterated the Illinois Central prohibition of large-
scale alienation of the state's ownership interest in tidelands where
maintenance of public uses was required by the general welfare, 4 4 and
found it apparent that the statutes authorized alienation of the state's
interest without any consideration of those special uses: 45
140. Section 2 provides:
People Shall Always Have Access to Navigable Waters
See. 2. No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the
frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water
in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water when-
ever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free
navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give
the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable
waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof. CAL.
CONsT. art. XV, § 2 (West 1954).
141. 166 Cal. at 587-88, 138 P. at 83-84.
142. Id. at 588, 138 P. at 84.
143. Id. at 589-90, 138 P. at 84-85. The court also reached the same conclusion
by a third route, utilizing the rule of statutory construction that "[a] statute will
not be construed to impair or limit the sovereign power of the state to act in its gov-
ernmental capacity and perform its governmental functions in behalf of the public
in general, unless such intent clearly appears." Id. at 592, 138 P. at 86.
144. Id. at 584-85, 138 P. at 82-83. The statutes in question purported to authorize
the absolute alienation of the state's interest in virtually the entire coastline (id. at 591,
138 P. at 85), an area where the state had a responsibility to protect public uses, a
situation parallel to that in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, although infinitely more
egregious.
145. Id. at 590, 138 P. at 85. The purpose of the statutes was found to be to secure
the reclamation of land suitable for agriculture and to make it productive. Id. at 591,
138 P. at 85. In fact, the original statutes had authorized such alienation only of
swamp lands conveyed to the state by the federal government (Act of Sept. 28, 1850,
ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519), expressly for that purpose. 166 Cal. at 591, 138 P. at 85. The
inclusion of tidelands into subsequent statutes had apparently been due to the inadvertent
sale of tidelands by state officials as swamp lands under the previous statutes. Id. at
591-92, 138 P. at 85. Thus, both swamp lands and tidelands were to be sold by the
same procedure and for the identical purpose of reclamation and drainage to make
them fit for agriculture. Id. at 592, 138 P. at 86. However, no provision had been
made for segregating those tidelands never covered by water and fit only for such
reclamation and agriculture from those tidelands on the shores of navigable bays, rivers,
COMMENTS
This apparent neglect and failure even to mention the paramount inter-
ests of navigation shows that there was no intention to deal with that
subject or to affect the public easement for that purpose.140
Since the navigable tidelands patented under the statutes had not been
legislatively determined to be freed from th' trust for either of the two
reasons permissible under Illinois Central,147 the patents were conse-
quently held to be invalid to convey the entirety of the state's inter-
est.
148
Although Illinois Central and prior California cases furnished ade-
quate precedent for holding the conveyances to have been absolutely
invalid, 149 the court refused to follow those prior holdings' 5" and made
an interesting and highly sophisticated, albeit questionable and per-
haps unfortunate, refinement of the Illinois Central requirement.
In order that "the private right of the purchaser [should] be given as
full effect as the public interests [would] permit,"' 5' the court held that
the patentee of navigable tidelands had received:
title to the soil, the jus privatum, subject to the public right .
and in subordination to the right of the state to take possession and
use and improve it . . . , as it may deem necessary. 52
It is necessary to recall here what was said earlier in a slightly differ-
ent context. A state, by its very nature, cannot hold property as a
monarch may, for private or personal purposes.' 53 Each state there-
fore succeeded to the ownership of both the personal and representa-
tive portions of the royal title in the only way it could, in a representa-
tive capacity.' 54 Holding the entirety of the previously apportioned
and beaches. Id. Nor was any discretion placed in any state officer or agency to deter-
mine whether any such tidelands for which application might be made were necessary
for purposes of navigation or what effect upon navigation their reclamation by a private
owner might have. Id. at 590, 138 P. at 85.
146. Id. at 592, 138 P. at 86.
147. Id. at 592-94, 138 P. at 85-86. See text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
148. Id. at 593-94, 138 P. at 86.
149. Id. at 594-96, 138 P. at 86-87.
150. Id. at 596, 138 P. at 87.
151. Id.
152. Id. This was simply the final, perhaps inevitable, step. The court deter-
mined the previous year in Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 32-34, 127 P. 156,
159-60 (1912) that such lands not legislatively freed of the trust would remain
subject to it, irrespective of whatever title, if any, the patentee had received. It must
have seemed a simple matter to hold that title had passed. In Forestier, the de-
fendants stipulated to the patent's validity to convey title and the question of whether
or not title had in fact passed was not before the court. Id. at 30-31, 127 P. at 159.
153. See notes 86-95 supra and accompanying text.
154. This was due to their inheritance of the English common law which decreed
that the sovereign power held such lands for public uses. See notes 106-09 supra
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legal and equitable titles in the same representative manner and on
the same condition that its property be used to promote the general
welfare, the entire ownership, legal title as well as all possible uses, be-
came jus publicum.155
This view of the entirety of the state's interest as jus publicum may
seem contrary to California Fish Co.'s direct holding of the existence
of a completely alienable jus privatum under the California trust; how-
ever, it must be recognized that (1) ownership by the sovereign power
began at opposite ends of the personal-representative continuum under
the English and American trusts, and (2) although the sum total of
interest represented by the jus privatum and the jus publicum is fixed,
their respective contents may vary.
Under the English trust, the king began with complete legal and
equitable ownership as a personal right (us privatum).1"5 A portion
of his private right was later shifted to the jus publicum as a right held
by him in a representative capacity, whose alienation into private own-
ership was deemed inimical to the general welfare.'6 7  Further shifting
from one aspect of the dual royal title to the other, in either direction,
remains within the scope of the Parliamentary equivalent of the police
power.158  Conversely, the independent American states began with
complete legal and equitable ownership held as a representative right
(Gus publicum). 9 Those portions of that complete ownership for
which representative ownership is determined to be unnecessary, i.e.,
alienation of which would not impair the requirements of the general
welfare, are transferred to the jus privatum as state rights which are
proprietary and freely alienable. 6 Illinois Central had recognized that
and accompanying text. Therefore, upon succession to the royal interest, they did so in
a representative capacity.
155. See note 43 supra.
156. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 42-46, 106, supra and accompanying text.
158. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 153-55 supra and accompanying text.
160. Such determinations are made, of course, by conditional limitations, but the
fact that the original conditional limitations inherited from England limited public
rights only to the uses of navigation and fishery did not shift the remainder of the
complete ownership into the jus privatum where it had lain under the English trust. See
note 46 supra and accompanying text. All elements of the complete ownership, began
as ius publicum under the American trust. See notes 153-55 supra and accompany-
ing text. But such elements are not transformed into jus privatum by a simple de-
termination that the public does not presently require an enforceable right to them.
Their maintenance as jus publicum without attached public rights may be deemed nec-
essary to protect those elements to which the public does have rights. See note 174
infra.
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the entire state interest could be transferred to the jus privatum and
alienated consistently with the absolute general welfare limitation in
certain special circumstances.16 California Fish Co. recognized the
permissibility of a partial shift.
The patenting statutes under examination in California Fish Co.
purported to transfer the entire state interest into the jus privatum.162
The court held that the statutes' failure to expressly disavow the prior
general welfare requirements prevented such a shift of the entirety of
the state's interest into the jus privatum.6 3 Such a failure required the
maintenance of state control over the uses made of the lands, but the
court reasoned that the promotion of the general welfare by such retained
state control over uses required no more than the retention of the
equitable ownership. Since the statutes had also purportedly shifted the
legal title into the jus privatum, and since its retention was viewed as
non-essential to the maintenance of such state control, the legislative
decision to transfer the legal title was upheld. 6 4  The patentee, as
grantee of the jus privatum, received "naked title to the soil," '165 but
nothing more. In California, therefore, only the bare legal title has been
transformed into ius privatum as regards tidelands generally. Even if
that title has been alienated, the entire equitable interest remains jus
publicum.'66
The unfortunate portion of the decision was that the court also held
the legal owner (patentee) has a license'67 to use the tidelands as he
sees fit,'6" until the state revokes the license by exercising its retained
interest. 69  Consequently, unless the state so acts, either to "take pos-
session and use and improve" or to merely "abate any nuisance or
161. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text.
162. 166 Cal. at 595-96, 138 P. at 87.
163. Id. See generally notes 143-48 supra and accompanying text.
164. 166 Cal. at 596, 138 P. at 87. See the latter part of note 160, supra.
165. 166 Cal. at 598, 138 P. at 88.
166. Nor has the bare legal title remained ]us prtvatum in California tidelands. See
note 174 infra and accompanying text.
167. See note 120 supra.
168. 166 Cal. at 599, 138 P. at 88.
169. Id. Note the similarity between this method of state retrieval of its control
over the tidelands and that of Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, where the grant was held
ineffective to convey more than a revocable license. See note 120 supra and ac-
companying text. Further, it must be noted that reclamation of such patented tide-
lands, with or without governmental approval, does not terminate the public trust ease-
ment absent a specific legislative determination that the particular lands in question are
freed from the trust. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d at 261, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 797. See Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 60 P.2d
825 (1936); Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal. 2d 31, 48 P.2d 20 (1935).
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purpresture"'1  created on patented tidelands, the reduction in the
state's ability to promote the public interest is effectively reduced to
the same low point where it would have been had the statutes validly
authorized absolute alienation.17 1
Nevertheless, the California public was, in a sense, very fortunate.
The attempted legislative determination of inutility of the lands for
the trust purposes contained in the patenting statutes might well have
been considered valid in its entirety. All that was lacking was an
ostensible specific consideration of the unique uses which previously
constituted the general welfare requirements. If such a legislative in-
tent to change those requirements is clear, it is conclusive on the
courts.' 72  A court that would go as far to promote and protect a
private interest as the court did in California Fish Co. would hardly
have attempted to question the validity of such a legislative determina-
tion had such been clearly stated.
The potential for such abuse has apparently been corrected by con-
ditional limitations. As aforementioned, the 1879 Constitution pro-
tects the equitable title by requiring any navigable waters alienated by
the state after that date to remain accessible for "any public pur-
170. 166 Cal. at 599, 138 P. at 88. A public nuisance is "[a]n unauthorized in-
vasion of the rights of the public to navigate the water flowing over the soil . .. .
People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 66 Cal. 138, 146, 4 P. 1152, 1155 (1884). A
purpresture is 'Tain inclosure by a private party of a part of that which belongs to and
ought to be open and free to the enjoyment of the public at large. It is not necessarily
a public nuisance. A public nuisance must be something which subjects the public to
some degree of inconvenience or annoyance; but a purpresture may exist without put-
ting the public to any inconvenience whatever." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1401
(4th ed. 1951). If not a nuisance or purpresture, an improvement on tidelands cannot
be removed without payment of just compensation. People v. California Fish Co., 166
Cal. at 599, 138 P. at 88; City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160,
183, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897).
171. See notes 91, 104 supra and accompanying text.
172. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 n.17, 476 P.2d 423, 437
n.17, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 n.17 (1970); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at
597, 138 P. at 88. Further, in California Fish Co., the court stated that "[i]f lands
on the sea beach alone were to be considered as excluded, there would be no
difficulty . . . ." Id. at 596, 138 P. at 87. The legislators' attempted shift of the
entirety of the state's interest into the jus privatum was rejected solely because it also
included tidelands on San Francisco and other large, populated bays, and "would pro-
duce the utmost confusion and uncertainty." Id. But, in present times, an exercise
of the police power, to be upheld, must "not [be] arbitrary, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory." Lees v. Bay Area Air Pollution Control Dis't, 238 Cal. App. 2d 850,
857, 48 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299 (1965) (emphasis added). But no case has mentioned
the applicability of this standard of review to legislative determinations concerning
tidelands. See generally 11 CAL. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 178 et seq. (judicial
review of propriety of exercises of police power).
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pose.' 1 73  A 1909 statute protects the state's legal title by banning
further sales."7
4
One cannot escape feeling, however, that such protections are tenuous
if not definitely ephemeral. In truth, without constant public vigilance,
they are. If, for example the statutory conditional limitation was abro-
gated, 175 California Fish Co. clearly shows the harm which might be
done to the public interest by the alienation of "naked title to the soil"
and subsequent permissive use by the private legal owner.
176
C. Adequacy of the California State Ownership Interest
The court closely restricted the patentee's vested interest to legal title.
On the other hand, it failed to characterize the state's retained interest as
the complete equitable ownership, although admitting the right of the
state to take possession for the purpose of promoting public uses. 77
This omission probably resulted from a confusion of the retained state
interest with the interest of the general public.
As has been shown, the public does not equitably own the fore-
shore,1 7  but the original conditional limitations inherited from the
common law of England decreed that the state's general welfare duty
required it to permit public use of its tidelands for purposes of naviga-
tion, commerce,' 79 and fishery. The public thus received an enforce-
able right to use the foreshore for those purposes.8 0 Such a specifically
enforceable power over the state's property generated the idea of a
property right "in equity," and the public's permissive right to use the
tidelands came to be characterized as a "public easement" for those
purposes.
181
173. See note 140 supra.
174. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN. § 7991 (West 1968) (formerly POL. CoDE §
3443a, added ch. 444, § 1, [1909] Cal. Stat. 774). However, grants-in-trust and leases
are still permissible. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 n.18,
476 P.2d 423, 437 n.18, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37 n.18 (1970).
175. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 168-71 supra and accompanying text.
177. 166 Cal. at 596-98, 138 P. at 87-88. In part, this may have been due to the
court's obvious desire to uphold the conveyance of an interest to the patentee as best
it could. The statutes purported to authorize a transfer of the entire ownership. To
admit in so many words that the entire beneficial interest had been withheld by the
state might have amounted to a legal failure of consideration. However, the going
price was only one dollar an acre (id. at 591, 138 P. at 85) and a "sufficient" con-
sideration for whatever the patentee received.
178. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 107 supra.
180. See notes 106-09 supra and accompanying text.
181. In a sense, the individual's right is an easement in gross in that it is "not
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Since the public "easement" was a license granted to the public by
the state to utilize its property, maintenance of such public uses re-
quired retention of a state ownership interest.'"" However, at that
time the state's police power had developed to thei point where its
equitable interest (even if complete) could support only such public
uses as navigation, commerce, and fishery.18 3  Its interest was char-
acterized as including no more than the administration and control of
such uses.'84 Today the state's capability to promote the general wel-
fare has developed to include additional modes of exercising its equi-
table ownership, 85 and is not limited by the prior "public easement" for
navigation, commerce, and fishery.
This public "easement" is discretionary with the state.'88 Should
the state's duty to promote the general welfare later require other (or
no) use of the tidelands, public use for the traditional purposes could
be materially altered or destroyed.1 8 7  The public's license was taken
subject to future defeasance should the absolute limitation require mod-
ification or abrogation of the conditional one which created it. 88
Consequently, although considered a "right" to use the state's interest
in the tidelands, impairment or destruction of the public's license
would not constitute a taking of private property within the meaning
of the constitutional protections. 89
appurtenant to any estate in land (or not belonging to any person by virtue of his
ownership of an estate in land) but a mere . . . right to use the land of another."
BLACK'S LAw DicxoNARy 600 (4th ed. 1951). Thus, terming the public's right a
"public easement" would, itself, seem to discount any ideas of equitable ownership by
the public. But, if it is an easement, it is subject to defeasance. See note 186 infra
and accompanying text.
182. See notes 103-09 supra and accompanying text.
183. On the development of the police power's permissible scope, see notes 197-99
infra and accompanying text. This was tacitly recognized by the court in California
Fish Co., when, having held tidelands patented after 1879 to be subject to "access for
any public purpose," they mentioned no other possibly permissible uses than naviga-
tion, commerce, and fishery. See notes 158-61 supra and accompanying text.
184. 166 Cal. at 597, 138 P. at 87.
185. See notes 197-99 infra and accompanying text.
186. Although this is not an "express trust," (note 93 supra) see generally A.
ScoTr, ABRIDGEMENT OF T-E LAW OF TRUSTS § 128.3 (Discretionary Trusts). Ap-
plying the terminology of that section to the tidelands problem: When the state uses
its land for the benefit of the citizenry, an individual is entitled only to that which the
state in its discretion decides to give him. Since, "[a] person has no property, no
vested interest, in any rule of the common law," Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134
(1877), the state is not prevented from changing what an individual receives, if nec-
essary to carry out its duty to promote the general welfare.
187. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 96-97, 105-10 supra.
189. See notes 260-68 infra and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the duty to promote the general welfare remains the sole
absolute limitation on state use of its interest in tidelands. Fortunately,
perhaps fortuitously, that state ownership interest has remained ade-
quate in the greater part of California's tidelands 9 ° to meet today's
general welfare requirements, if only those requirements be clearly
shown.
V. REDEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE
A. The Permissible Scope of a Redefinition
The state interest in tidelands which are either still in absolute state
ownership or in the legal ownership of a patentee contains a jus pub-
licum which, at a minimum, includes the entire equitable interest.191
Since the only absolute restriction on the state as to how it utilizes its
interest is that it promote the general welfare, one is naturally led to
wonder why the original trilogy of navigation, commerce, and fishery,
as the only uses of tidelands to which public rights were required by
the general welfare, has not been changed in over 120 years.
Of course, many have believed that the public rights are immutably
fixed to those three uses and no others,192 but these are lands "the
government of which, from the very nature of things, must vary with
varying circumstances,"' 93 and police power determinations as to their
mode of utilization must "meet the reasonable current requirements of
time and place and period in history.'
94
Early in California history, the motivation to effectuate any change
in public rights was probably lacking. The population was sufficiently
small that competition for the use of the tidelands was weak and the
threat of their irretrievable destruction by the forces of man was nei-
ther great, widespread, nor apparent. It may well have seemed ra-
tional then to believe that navigation, commerce, and fishery were the
only uses of the foreshore to which the public required enforceable
rights. The additional belief that the general welfare necessarily re-
quired the economic development of the state also militated against
the granting of any new public rights in the foreshore which could have
retarded that development. 9 5 But the lack of incentive in those earlier
190. See note 268 infra.
191. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
192. This belief is still held by some. See note 236 infra.
193. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).
194. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522,
370 P.2d 342, 346, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642 (1962).
195. See notes 127-28, 130-32 supra and accompanying text.
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days to add more humanistic public rights to the working terms of
the tidelands trust only partially explains why until recently there was
no attempt to add such additional rights. In truth, until recently the
paramount reason why purely environmental considerations had never
been implemented into enforceable public trust uses was that the scope
of the police power was not adequate to do so.1a 6
Although securing the general welfare is the real object of the police
power,197 "[i]n its inception the police power was closely concerned
with the preservation of the public peace, safety, morals, and health
without specific regard for 'the general welfare.' "18 It was believed
that only through the promotion of those four objectives could the
general welfare be subserved.1' 9 With the advancement of society,
however, the interpretation of the law has changed and the general
welfare of the people is now one of the legitimate, independent objec-
tives of the police power.200 It has long been settled that the concept
of the general welfare extends to regulations to promote the economic
welfare, public convenience, and general prosperity of the commu-
nity.20
1
Although the traditional view had been that the police power could
not be exercised for purely aesthetic objects, regulations having an
incidental aesthetic effect were often sustained on other grounds.
20 2
The requirement that there be an adequate and independent non-
aesthetic purpose for such regulations to be sustained was severely
limited by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Berman v.
Parker:
203
[T]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.204
196. See notes 197-99 infra and accompanying text.
197. East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
198. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
199. Id.
200. In re Kazas, 22 Cal. App. 2d 161, 166, 70 P.2d 962, 964-65 (1937).
201. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. at 485, 234 P. at 383; accord, Chicago,
B. & 0. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
202. See generally Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the
Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1954) and the cases discussed therein. See
also 26 CAIF. L. REv. 155 (1937).
203. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
204. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
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Thus, as society "develops politically, economically, and socially, the
police power likewise develops to meet the changed and changing
conditions."20 5  But as the California Supreme Court had pointed out
even prior to Berman:
This apparent extension of the police power is in fact no extension at
all. The police power has not expanded. Its proper exercise has al-
ways been and still is confined to regulations in the public welfare
... * However, changed social, political and economic conditions have
enlarged the field of conduct which may properly be subjected to reg-
ulation in order that the general welfare may be adequately protected.
The proper application of the power cannot be measured by past
precedents-the test is, of course, present day conditions.208
Therefore, California's police power has developed to maintain its abil-
ity to promote and protect the general welfare as required by present
circumstances. Although, under California law, "aesthetic considera-
tions alone cannot sustain a statute or ordinance which impinges sub-
stantially upon private property rights," 20 7 in state-owned tidelands,
there are no private property rights. An exercise of state police power
in patented tidelands, even to achieve purely aesthetic objectives, would
in no substantial way encroach upon the property rights of the patentee.
His legal title continues unaffected while the state is exercising its
retained trust powers. 208  The potential scope of p6rmissible uses under
the California tidelands trust is therefore limited solely by the scope of
present perceptions of the general welfare.209 Since the means are ade-
quate to achieve the end, the apparent limitation is no limitation at all.
B. Prior Ad Hoc Redefinitions
It seems appropriate to ask, therefore, not only why the legislature
205. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. at 484, 234 P. at 383.
206. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.
2d 634, 644, 82 P.2d 3, 9 (1938) (emphasis added).
207. City of Santa Barbara v. Modem Neon Sign Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 197,
11 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 (1961).
208. Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 12 Cal. 2d 235, 239, 83 P.2d 21, 23
(1938); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 599, 138 P. at 88 (1913).
209. Nor could the state be equitably estopped to assert the continued applicabil-
ity of the public trust to patented tidelands for purposes other than navigation, com-
merce, and fishery. Although, in extreme cases, estoppel will be granted, the state
must be found guilty of either (1) an express intention to deceive, or (2) a careless
and culpable negligence sufficient to amount to constructive fraud. City of Long
Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 489-91, 476 P.2d 423, 442-44, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23,
42-44 (1970). Further, even in the absence of any state exercise of its trust powers,
such sovereign lands are not, in California, subject to the acquisition of private rights
by adverse possession. United States v. Gossett, 416 F.2d 565, 569 (9th Cir. 1969).
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has failed to extensively modify the original public uses in over 120
years, but also how it managed to avoid the necessity of making any
such modifications.
The principal reason a redefinition of the requirements of the public
welfare was so long avoided was the inherent expansiveness of the terms
"navigation, commerce, and fishery." In essence, as the requirements
of the general welfare changed, and the police power developed in a
parallel fashion to maintain its ability to meet those demands, the in-
clusiveness of the traditional purposes was judicially expanded. Thus,
as the general welfare developed a need for a public right to recrea-
tion as well as navigation, commerce, and fishery and as the police
power developed a capability to meet that need, the judicial definition
given "navigation" was expanded to include recreational navigation.210
Prior to Marks, this expansion of the permissible content of the three
traditional public uses had advanced to the point where a particular
usage would be upheld if it were (1) for a public purpose, and (2)
either incidental, necessary, or merely convenient for the promotion
and accommodation of the directly water-related uses. 211  These two
requirements were themselves "stretched" in turn to uphold specific
usages of the foreshore whose connection with the traditional trust pur-
poses could, at best, be termed fanciful.212
There is no single satisfactory explanation why legislative authoriza-
tion of prior "deviate" uses were not recognized by the courts to be
independently permissible uses. At times, the specific usage was not
210. See, e.g., Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912) (boating for
the purpose of hunting water fowl permissibly within "navigation"); Bohn v. Albert-
son, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951) (purely recreational boating up-
held). The "break" seems to have come in Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara,
23 Cal. 2d 170, 175, 143 P.2d 1, 3 (1943) wherein the court first stated that "[the
right of the public to use navigable waters . . . is not limited to any particular type of
craft. Pleasure yachts and fishing boats are used for navigation and the state. . . can
provide harborage for them as well as for merchant vessels and steamers."
211. SAx, supra note 19, at 536-37. Therefore, the particular usage itself did not
need to be a "public use," merely a use for a "public purpose." On the importance of
this in the light of today's needs in the tidelands, see note 270 infIra and accompany-
ing text.
212. See, e.g., People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. 2d 875, 338 P.2d 177 (1959),
wherein it was held that the construction of an armed forces Y.M.C.A. on tidelands
was "not only consistent with but in direct aid of the basic trust purpose to establish
and maintain a harbor and necessary or convenient related facilities for the 'promo-
tion and accommodation of commerce and navigation'." Id. at 880, 338 P.2d at 179.
Its purpose was "in direct aid" because the intent was held to be to "promote 'the
moral and social welfare of seamen, naval officers and enlisted men, and other per-
sons engaged in and about the harbor. . . '" Id.
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authorized by the legislature, but rather by a local governmental unit
under a state grant-in-trust or lease, in which case the traditional limita-
tions would still have been applicable.21 3 In those cases where the
usage had been specifically authorized by the legislature it might have
been legally supportable only under the traditional public uses.21 4  The
process of expanding the coverage of the traditional public uses may have
been self-feeding, and courts may well have wished to avoid, if possible, a
direct determination of how the original public purposes could be varied.
The judges of those earlier days probably believed the purposes were then
fixed to navigation, commerce, and fishery, either because the develop-
ment of the police power had not then reached the necessary level to
independently uphold the particular questioned usage at that time, or be-
cause they erroneously felt the purposes were completely immutable.215
In any case, the expansion of the coverage of the traditional trust
purposes allowed the specific usages made of the foreshore to keep
pace with "current requirements of time and place" without a de jure
addition of new public uses. Today's requirements, however, necessi-
tate public rights to uses whose arguable incidental promotion of the
traditional trust purposes would be untenable, even under the distorted
reading of "navigation, commerce, and fishery. ' 216  New, independently
permissible public uses are required. Certainly the non-use approved by
the Marks dictum21 7 would be beyond the scope of the traditional uses.
C. The Recognized Need for Redefinition
The need for such a change in public uses under the trust has been
recognized by the California legislature. The Marine Resources Con-
213. See, e.g., People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. 2d 875, 338 P.2d 177 (1959);
SAX, supra note 19, at 536-38 wherein the author contends that such leases or grants-
in-trust generally had a proviso requiring general compliance with the traditional
trust terms.
214. See, e.g., Ventura Port Dist. v. Taxpayers, 53 Cal. 2d 227, 347 P.2d 305,
1 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1959) wherein the proposed small boat harbor may have been inade-
quate as a public purpose, see note 270 infra and accompanying text, unless considered
part of a larger harbor project, benefiting a larger class of the public. Id. at 230,
347 P.2d at 308, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
215. Frankly, such a stretching of the traditional trust purposes could not have
come about unless there was a general feeling that they were immutable, or, at least,
an uncertainty as to how they could be modified.
216. The public purpose of preservation as a bird sanctuary recognized by Marks,
6 Cal. 3d at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796, could not, in this writer's
opinion, be supported by the traditional trust purposes, even in a more extended con-
dition than they have thus far reached.
217. Id.
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servation and Development Act of 1967218 declares it "to be the pol-
icy of the State of California to develop, encourage, and maintain a
comprehensive, coordinated state plan for the orderly, long-range con-
servation and development of marine and coastal resources which will
ensure their wise multiple use in the total public interest.' '21 9  The Act
further requires that various environmental and ecological considera-
tions be implemented by that state coastal zone plan,220 including inter
alia:
1. The conservation and utilization of the mineral and living re-
sources of the marine environment; 221
2. Recreation; 222
3. Research and education; 228
4. Weather, climate, and the monitoring of oceanographic condi-
tions;224 and
5. Social, economic, and legal matters relative to the conservation
and utilization of ocean resources.2 25
The Act recognized that the general welfare called for the effectua-
tion of environmental and ecological interests balanced against the nec-
essary and beneficial development and use of the coastal zone and its
resources. 26 Legislative action, of course, is a discretionary determi-
nation of what is needed to promote the general welfare. 2 7 The gen-
eral welfare has been legislatively deemed to call for the creation of
public rights to whatever uses of tidelands might be found necessary
to fulfill the Act's policies. 228  Although not granting public rights to
any additional uses, the legislature has pledged itself to establish such
218. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 8800-27 (West Supp. 1972).
219. Id. § 8800. On the problems of coastal zone management in California, see
Kruger, Management: The California Experience, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 402 (1972).
220. The Plan was to be formulated by the California Advisory Commission on
Marine and Coastal Resources, created by the Act (CAL. GOV'T CODE, ANN. § 8810
(West Supp. 1972)), which was instructed to implement the considerations listed in the
text accompanying notes 221-25 infra, by appropriate action. CAL. Gov'T Con ANN.
§ 8825 (West Supp. 1972).
221. CAL. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 8825(d) (West Supp. 1972).
222. Id. § 8825(e).
223. Id. § 8825(j).
224. Id. § 8825(k).
225. Id. § 8825(l).
226. Id. § 8800. See note 227 infra.
227. That policy is expressed in its conditional limitations. See notes 96-97 Supra
and accompanying text.
228. See notes 220-25 supra and accompanying text.
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new public rights as the environmental and ecological policies of the
Act may require.22
9
D. The Positive Duty of Redefinition
That the California Supreme Court considered a change in the en-
forceable public rights in tidelands imminent after passage of the Act
can be seen by noting the subsequent modification of its definition of
the trust and its purposes. No longer referring to a trust for "public
use for purposes of navigation and fishery,"23 0 the court noted in 1970
that it was a "trust for public purposes, which have traditionally been
delineated in terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries."2 31  By rel-
egating the traditional trust purposes to the position of a postscript
the court clearly signaled its belief that the prospective delineation of
the public purposes would be more expansive.
It has been noted that the police power has developed to the point
where it can regulate tidelands with purely aesthetic objectives, 2 2 and
that the legislature has determined conservation of the tidelands is re-
quired by the general welfare to an extent not yet precisely deline-
ated.233  Consequently, the Marks court was able to recognize "the
preservation of those lands in their natural state" as "a use [presently]
encompassed within the tidelands trust ... ,24 The court men-
tioned scientific study, open space, wildlife habitat, scenic, and cli-
229. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 8801 (a) (West Supp. 1972). Other states have en-
acted requirements that environmental factors be considered in the use and disposition
of their tidelands. Oregon, for example, has declared its entire ocean shore to be a
recreational area. ORE. RaV. STAT. § 390.615 (1971). All improvements in that area
require a permit which is granted subject to the following considerations, inter alia:
The public need for healthful, safe, aesthetic surroundings.
The natural, scenic, recreational and other resources in the area. Id. § 390.640(1).
The present and prospective need for conservation and development of those re-
sources. Id. § 390.655(1).
Florida, on the other hand, requires, biological and ecological surveys to be made
prior to any sale of public lands. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.12(4)(d) (Supp. 1972).
Such a sale can only then be made if the results preclude interference with "fish, marine,
and wildlife or other natural resources, including beaches and shores, to such an extent
as to be contrary to the public interest." Id. However, neither the specific considera-
tions composing that "public interest," nor the relative weights they are to be given, are
specified.
230. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 596, 138 P. at 87.
231. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 437, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 37 (1970) (emphasis added).
232. See text accompanying notes 207-09 supra.
233. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 8800, 8801(a) (West Supp. 1972). See notes 218-19,
227-28 supra and accompanying text.
234. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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mactic considerations23 5 as being served by such preservation. By
basing non-use on such environmental and ecological factors, the court
was clearly recognizing conservation as an independent use within the
trust and not merely as a permissible manner in which to exercise the
traditional trust purposes. 238 Further, the discussion of preservation
as a use was merely meant to be illustrative. The court's mention of
"all the public uses" presently encumbering tidelands2 7 demonstrates
the court's belief that there are other "new" uses besides preservation
within the scope of the trust.
The court did not assert that the public presently has a right to
preservation of the tidelands in their natural state, in either particular
parcels or the tidelands as a whole. 2s8  The legislature declared pres-
ervation and other uses encompassed within the policies of the Marine
Resources Conservation and Development Act of 1967 to be in the
general welfare, but the legislature failed to specify the priority which
particular uses were to be given. Rather, it committed itself to make
such determinations later in the form of a comprehensive coastal zone
plan. 2 9  Nevertheless, no substantial progress had been made in meet-
ing that commitment by the time of the Marks decision in 1971.249
The legislature's own creation, the California Advisory Commission on
Marine and Coastal Resources, 41 pointed out in 1970 that "existing
legislation is not adequate to protect the public interest." 242  The Cali-
fornia Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Quality acknowl-
edged an increased public awareness that "immediate action must be
taken to prevent the destruction of these environmental values. 243
235. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. Compare the reasons
given herein with text accompanying notes 238-42 infra.
236. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. Some persons close to the Marks
decision, it must be admitted, still believe the case merely established preservation as
an acceptable variant mode of exercising the traditional trust purposes. E.g., interview
with J. L. Shavelson, Cal. Ass't Att'y Gen. and member of the state amicus party in
Marks, in Los Angeles, California, Feb. 9, 1973. However, these parties are unable to
explain why the court failed to recognize a public right, even of indeterminate relative
weight vis-h-vis the more customary modes of exercising the traditional trust purposes,
to the use of preservation. Again, see notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
237. 6 Cal. 3d at 260, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
238. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. See notes 24-25 supra
and accompanying text.
239. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 8800, 8801(a) (West Supp. 1972).
240. See note 14 supra.
241. See note 220 supra.
242. See note 13 supra.
243. See notes 218-29 supra.
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As Professor Sax has indicated, the court would be unwilling to es-
tablish guidelines for the implementation and relative priorities of new
public uses required by the redefined public interest if the decision
could be passed back to the more representative forum of the legislature
for resolution.244 By the dictum, the Marks court was reminding the
legislature of its failure to meet its self-imposed commitment. To as-
sure the legislature that it had the power to augment the existent pub-
lic uses as might be required by the Act's policies, the court noted that:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the
state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one
mode of utilization over another.245
To emphasize the legislature's role as the proper forum for such deter-
minations, the court pointed out that "[lt is a political question,
within the wisdom and power of the Legislature, acting within the scope
of its duties as trustee, to determine whether public trust uses should
be modified. . . and to take the necessary steps. ..."246
The reason for the court's attempt to prod the legislature was its
continued failure to enact the conditional limitations required to im-
plement its previously declared policies. This legislative delay was fast
approaching the point of harming the public welfare and thus violating
the absolute limitation on state authority.247 Behind that warning
was the implied threat that the court could not permit the state to vio-
late the absolute limitation on its authority, that there are limits which
the court would impose and that the situation was very close to de-
manding a judicial delineation of minimum standards. 248
E. Subsequent Progress Toward a Redefinition
On November 7, 1972, the court received what may be, tempo-
rarily at least, an, adequate response to its call for action from an even
more representative forum than the legislature. Acting through the
initiative process, the people of California remedied the failure of their
legislators to redefine the requirements of their welfare and passed the
244. SAx, supra note 19, at 558.
245. 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (citations omitted).
246. Id. at 260-61, 491 P.2d at 381, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (citation omitted).
247. Le., harmful to the extent of requiring judicial intervention to prevent the
state's conduct from being ultra vires.
248. SAx, supra note 19, at 543. The judicially-drawn minimum standards would,
of course, be within the general scope delineated by the Act's partial resolution of the
political question.
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Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.40
The Act establishes a state-wide commission which must prepare,
adopt, and submit to the legislature's 1976 regular session a "Cali-
fornia Coastal Zone Conservation Plan."26 0  This plan's objectives are
similar to those of the antecedent Marine Resources Conservation and
Development Act of 1967.251 If implemented, the Plan would grant
public rights to new uses of tidelands insofar as it determines the per-
missible use or uses to be made of the foreshore.
2
5
2
In the interim period between February 1, 1973, and the 91st day
after adjournment of the legislature's 1976 regular session,266 virtually
any development within a permit area encompassing the tidelands must
be authorized by one of six regional commissions created by the Act.
2 54
A permit for the dredging and filling of tidelands requires a two-thirds
vote by the appropriate regional commission.2 55 The commission's
approval depends upon its finding "[tihat the development will not
have any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect.
'2
5
0
Theoretically, at least, virtually all development of the tidelands could
be halted under the terms of the Act for approximately four years.
2
5
7
Such coastal zone management plans as that required by the Act
have received a fair amount of legal commentary in recent years.268
249. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 27000-27650 (West Supp. 1973).
250. Id. § 27312.
251. Compare id. § 27302(a)-(d) with CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 8825(d)(e), (j)-
(1) (West 1964). Initiative measures cannot be legislatively altered unless therein pro-
vided. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The 1972 Act so provides, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE
ANN. § 27650.5 [[1972] Cal. Stat. A-188], if "to better achieve the objectives" of the Act.
252. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN. § 27304 (West Supp. 1973). This is, of course, a big
"if." Were the legislature to reject the Plan, the situation would revert back to what
it was before November, 1972. If such were the case, one might reasonably expect the
court to impose its own minimal standards within the limits of the 1969 Act. See
notes 247-48 supra and accompanying text.
253. It is on the 91st day after adjournment of the regular session that California
statutes normally take effect. CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
254. CAL. Pun. Rns. CODE ANN. §§ 27400-27405 (West Supp. 1973). Repairs and im-
provements not over $7,500 to existing single-family residences are excepted (Id. §
27405(a)), as is maintenance dredging of existing navigation channels under permit
from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Id. § 27405(b).
255. Id. § 27401(a).
256. Id. § 27402(a).
257. See notes 254-56 supra and accompanying text.
258. E.g., UNWvERsrrY OF MAu, supra note 6; Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legis-
lation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 351 (1970); Knight, Proposed Systems of
Coastal Zone Management: An Interim Analysis, 3 NAT. RES. LAW. 599 (1970);
Note, Coastal Zone Management-The Tidelands: The Legislative Apathy vs. Judicial
Concern, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 695 (1971).
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It is recognized that these plans almost invariably encounter serious
difficulties in implementing their objectives since they are inadequately
funded and cannot meet the expense required by large scale exercises
of state eminent domain. 259
The California Constitution requires compensation to be paid not
only for the "taking" of private property for public use, but also for
its "damaging."2 60  The amount of compensation is determined by the
diminution in market value of the interest taken or damaged.261  Thus,
the implementation of new public uses within the tidelands would seem
to damage the bare legal title of a patentee.262 But, in fact, the pat-
entee's legal title would not be affected although his license to use
263
the tidelands would be revoked by such state action. Such an exercise
by the state of its absolute equitable interest would not be actionable
under the doctrine of damnum absque injuria if carried out by a pri-
vate party similarly situated. 264  The constitutional provision has not
been construed as creating a new right to recovery in the private prop-
erty owner,265 but simply as ensuring his ability to recover against
the state.266  Therefore, no cause of action nor right to compensation
would lie against the state for whatever use it chose to make of its re-
tained interest in patented tidelands.
267
259. UrvERsrrY oF MAINE, supra note 6, at 531.
260. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having first been made . . . "' CAL. CO NST. art. I, § 14 (West 1954).
The Federal Constitution imposes on the states no liability for damage without taking,
in spite of an increasingly liberal expansion of the concept of taking. See generally
Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALm. L. Rnv. 596
(1954). The California provision alone, then, need be dealt with herein.
261. Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 739, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942).
262. Damage is not compensable if it results from a valid police power regulation of
private property. Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, supra note 260, at 608.
Logically, the implementation of new public uses would not merely be a police power
regulation of private property, but a "public improvement" of the state's interest
which gives rise to compensation if damaging the patentee's legal title. Id. But see
note 120 supra and notes 264-67 and accompanying text infra.
263. See note 120 supra.
264. "Mhe doctrine of damnum absque injuria . . . means merely that a person
may suffer damages and be without remedy because no legal right or right estab-
lished by law and possessed by him, has been invaded .... "Rose v. State, 19 Cal.
2d 713, 729, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942).
265. Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 56 Cal. 2d 603, 608,
364 P.2d 840, 842, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1961); Archer v. City of Los Angeles,
19 Cal. 2d 19, 24, 119 P.2d 1, 4 (1941).
266. See cases cited in note 265 supra.
267. Of course, however, "Itihe constitutional requirement of due process of law
• . . applies in every case at the exertion of governmental power." Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 593 (1906).
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Since patented and absolutely state-owned tidelands make up the
greater part of the state's foreshore, 2 8 the tidelands trust may permit
California's Coastal Zone Conservation Plan to be more than adequately
effective at a more than acceptable cost.269
As Marks has tacitly acknowledged, any public purpose, even com-
plete non-use, is within the terms of the tidelands trust and is capable
of being made subject to a public right if deemed requisite for the gen-
eral welfare.2 70  Since the state's interest in most tidelands is still suffi-
cient to exercise the full range of such uses without the need to pay
compensation, the development of every parcel of the foreshore still
encompassed by the trust could be halted at its present point indef-
initely.27' Of course, such a complete ban on development would not
necessarily be best for the total public interest.2 7 2  However, such re-
striction as should be made would also have an incidental effect on the
development of private property inland, even were it otherwise com-
pletely unrestricted .2 7  How far inland the effect would carry with
268. The State Lands Commission estimates that there are approximately 125
square miles (80,000 acres) of patented tidelands in California, extending along several
hundred miles of the state's coastline. See Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked
Fee?, 47 CALiF. ST. BJ. 420, 423 (1972). The exact extent of tidelands still in ab-
solute state ownership was unavailable to this writer, but, of the 1,087 miles of
"coastline," the state still owns about 408 miles. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3, 1973,
§ I, at 1, col. 8. Whether this "coastline" includes tidelands was not therein made
clear. However, the only tidelands not either patented or state-owned would be those
relatively small parcels which have been legislatively determined to be freed from the
trust, or which have been granted in trust to smaller governmental entities. The re-
mainder would still be subject to an adequate state ownership interest.
269. Being able to implement new public uses in what appears, at a minimum, to be
the foreshore of three-quarters of the state's coastline (supra note 268), without any
need to pay compensation (supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text), is not all this
signifies. See note 275 infra and accompanying text.
270. The police power, of course, must be exercised for public purposes only, Bin-
ford v. Boyd, 178 Cal. 458, 461, 174 P. 56, 58 (1918), and a public purpose is merely
one which "has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals,
[or) general welfare . . . ." BLACK's LAW DICTIONAY 1394 (4th ed. 1951) (empha-
sis added). Therefore, the duty of the state in exercising its police power to deter-
mine the use made of tidelands does not require any public use. Complete non-use, if
fitting within the above definition of a public purpose, is also permissible.
271. See notes 182-89 supra and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., the recognition of the need for balancing conservation and necessary
development contained in the Marine Resources Conservation and Development Act
of 1967, CAL. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 8825(d) (West Supp. 1972). See text accompanying
note 221.
273. Since activities on the littoral property almost invariably revolve about some
use of the adjoining tidelands whether recreational or commercial, any prohibition of
that use in the tidelands in question would seriously hamper, if not effectively elimi-
nate, the inland activity.
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significant force is, as yet, undetermined. 4  But if such indirect reg-
ulation were of any real import, its minimal cost alone would become
significant.
275
CONCLUSION
The uses to which California's tidelands are put can be modified
to accommodate whatever particular usage is deemed necessary to pro-
mote the general welfare of the people.2 78 The need for a redefinition
of the requirements of that welfare in light of today's needs has been
recognized.2 7 7  Moreover, significant action is again being taken to
effectuate that reevaluation, 78 with the obligation imposed on the state
to continue it to completion. The implementation of environmen-
tally-based public uses in the tidelands, together with a complementary
regulatory, or zoning, plan inland, would provide the best possible
protection of the public interest in California's most unique natural re-
source: its irreplaceable coastal zone.
The ability is present. The need is recognized. But whether or not
the general welfare will be adequately served along the shore depends
on whether it is accurately defined by the legislature both in the imme-
diate and more distant future. Further, the requirements of. the pub-
lie welfare, once accurately set forth, will not remain so untended. It
is the people of California who must remain vigilant to ensure that the
legal definition of their requirements keeps pace with their actual needs
and desires.
28 0
Timothy H. Ziemann
274. But the inland extent of this effect has not, it seems, been adequately examined
to permit definitive statement.
275. Since the initial, direct "restriction" on the tidelands would be possible at
little or no cost, virtually any real inland effect would be significant. This is not to
say, however, that such an effect would necessarily be minimal. The same considera-
tions which apply to the situations described in note 273 supra apply as well to land
further inland. The question to be resolved is how quickly, or slowly, the effect
dissipates as one moves inland. It may well be that the significant effect would be
limited to immediate littoral property. The possibility of a more extensive influ-
ence cannot as yet be rejected.
276. See text immediately following note 189 supra.
277. See notes 218-29 supra and accompanying text.
278. See notes 249-57 and accompanying text,
279. Even should the legislature fail to approve the Plan submitted to it under the
Coastal Zone Conservation Act, the obligation which it imposed upon itself under the
Marine Resources Conservation and Development Act would still be binding. See
notes 218-29 supra and accompanying text.
280. "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
